THE MERGER AUTHORIZATION CRITERIA IN MALAWI; AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS

7th ACER Week Conference 16th September, 2022



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INTRODUCTION

S38(2) of the CFTA- mergers/acquisitions are to be authorized if on a balance, the advantages of the merger to Malawians outweigh the disadvantages. i.e.:

- Efficient Units at lower production/distribution costs
- Increased net exports; employment
- Lower consumer price;
- Accelerated Economic and Technological Advancement

However, unclear how this "balance" can be attained leaving room for discretionary interpretation.

Hypothesis

• The criteria for merger/acquisition authorization does not accord consumer welfare considerations adequate weight as a determining factor in merger authorization.

Main and Specific Objectives

Main Objective

 To examine the weight accorded to consumer welfare considerations in applying the merger authorization criteria under the CFTA

Specific objectives:

- To explore the meaning of consumer welfare considerations
- To investigate the interpretation of the criteria for merger/acquisition authorization under the CFTA
- To examine the suitability of the current merger/acquisition criteria in protecting consumer welfare

Main and Specific Research Questions

Main Question

 To what extent do consumer welfare considerations inform merger/acquisition decisions under the CFTA


Specific Questions

- What are consumer welfare considerations under the CFTA?
- How has the Commission interpreted the criteria for merger/acquisition authorization under the CFTA?
- How suitable are the current merger/acquisition criteria in protecting consumer welfare?

Methodology

- Doctrinal Approach
- Desk Research
- Statutory Interpretation
- Legal Reasoning
- Mergers identified through purposive sampling
- Inductive reasoning-to identify general rules from the selected merger decisions

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Competition theory- competition is efficient as maximises welfare, i.e. lower prices, more products, more choice.

Law and Economics- Richard Posner- Law is efficient; Law ought to be efficient.

Oliver Wendell Holmes- Apply the law/ drafters' wish- need for objectivity+ pragmatism

Conclusion: An efficient merger authorization criteria is clear, objective, consistent with the goals pf the CFTA and authorizes efficient mergers.

Under CFTA- protection of competition and consumers+ promotion of economic development.

Selected Mergers

- 1. Indirect Acquisition of Celtel by Bharti Airtel- Public Interest Advantages of employment, consumer efficiency gains from Airtel's market dominance over possible competition concerns
- 2. Acquisition of Dairibord Malawi by Lilongwe Dairy- Saving jobs + a failing firm over creation of dominant post-merger entity; reducing competition and creating possibility of adverse effects on cpnsumer welfare
- 3. Acquisition of SS Poultry by Central Poultry Merger authorized with conditions to address competition concerns -to save a failing firm although- competition concerns due to dominant post-merger entity.
- 4. Acquisition of Kulimba Cement by Lafarge- Advantages from creation of employment + new products over possible negative insignificant effects from changes in market structure
- 5. CID's Decision on Merger between B.I.H & Carlsberg Mw Ltd. Possible efficiency gains from transaction prioritized over competition and public interest concerns of loss of employment. Not much discussion on consumer welfare.

Observations

- A Majority of Decisions by CFTC, production Efficiencies and Public Interest concerns prioritized over their respective effects on consumer welfare.
- CFTC does consider consumer welfare e.g. CP and Dairibord Mergers on product choice
- Carlsberg Merger (CCC) Possible abuse of market dominance and collusion in competing entities in which Castel had shareholding but authorized in public interest
- **Conclusion:** Application of Efficiencies Defence and Public Interest over effects on competition and consumer welfare. Questionable if authorization due to public interest concerns is always efficient.
- Under emphasis of symbiotic relationship between competition and consumer welfare.

Post-Merger Effects on Consumers

- Small Scale Poultry Farmers complained to CFTC over CP's postmerger dominance
 - CFTC threatened to revoke CP's licence for stifling other entities in the market
- Reduction in product quality and product choice e.g. Carlsberg Castel merger
 - Consumers complained to CFTC about finding foreign objects in drinks-Castel fined by CFTC for the same
 - Consumers complained that some of their favourite drinks by Carlsberg did not taste the same under Castel

Celtel + Airtel Merger led to more innovation e.g. Introduction of 3G internet

Conclusion:

Production Efficiency gains and Public Interest Concerns given more weight over Competition and consumer welfare concerns

 While public interest concerns prioritized in developing countries like Mw, debatable whether this is always efficient i.e. Increases total welfare.

Recommendations

- Amendment of CFTA to provide for an objective test when to use the efficiencies defence e.g. proof that efficiencies will benefit consumers.
- ➤ Superior Propane Case-Merger resulted in a monopoly but benefits to Canadian Government outweighed anti-competitive effects.
- ➤ Balancing weights approach- calculation based on econometric evidence the minimum weight on consumer surplus relative to profits that would render a merger unacceptable.
- >IV/m.50 v. AT & T/NCR- potential advantages from synergies dismissed because they did not benefit consumers.

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THANK YOU, QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS ARE WELCOME